Publication
PETS 2024
Conference paper

SWiSSSE: System-Wide Security for Searchable Symmetric Encryption

Abstract

his paper initiates a new direction in the design and analysis of searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) schemes. We provide the first comprehensive security model and definition for SSE that takes into account leakage from the entirety of the SSE system, including not only from access to encrypted indices but also from access to the encrypted database documents themselves. Such system-wide leakage is intrinsic in end-to-end SSE systems, and can be used to break almost all state-of-the-art SSE schemes (Gui et al., IEEE S&P 2023). We then provide static and dynamic SSE constructions targeting our new notions. Our constructions involve a combination of novel techniques: bucketization to hide volumes of responses to queries; delayed, pseudorandom write-backs to disrupt access patterns; and indistinguishable search and update operations. The oblivious operations make it easy to establish strong versions of forward and backward security for our dynamic SSE scheme and rule out file-injection attacks. We implement our schemes and demonstrate that they offer very strong security against general classes of (system-wide) leakage-abuse attacks with moderate overhead. Our schemes scale smoothly to databases containing hundreds of thousand of documents and millions of keyword-document pairs. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first end-to-end SSE schemes that effectively suppress system-wide leakage while maintaining practical efficiency.

Date

Publication

PETS 2024