Christian Badertscher, Ran Canetti, et al.
TCC 2020
The most compact quantum-safe proof systems for large circuits are PCP-type systems such as Ligero, Aurora, and Shockwave, that only use weak cryptographic assumptions, namely hash functions modeled as random oracles. One would expect that by allowing for stronger assumptions, such as the hardness of Module-SIS, it should be possible to design more compact proof systems. But alas, despite considerable progress in lattice-based proofs, no such proof system was known so far. We rectify this situation by introducing a Lattice-Based Recursively Amortized Demonstration Of R1CS (LaBRADOR), with more compact proof sizes than known hash-based proof systems. At the 128 bits security level, LaBRADOR proves knowledge of a solution for an R1CS mod with constraints, with a proof size of only 58 KB, an order of magnitude more compact than previous quantum-safe proofs.
Christian Badertscher, Ran Canetti, et al.
TCC 2020
Ehud Aharoni, Nir Drucker, et al.
CSCML 2023
Jonathan Bootle, Vadim Lyubashevsky, et al.
ESORICS 2021
Matilda Backendal, Hannah Davis, et al.
CRYPTO 2024