C.A. Micchelli, W.L. Miranker
Journal of the ACM
Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) systems have shown great promise in natural language processing. However, their reliance on data stored in a retrieval database, which may contain proprietary or sensitive information, introduces new privacy concerns. Specifically, an attacker may be able to infer whether a certain text passage appears in the retrieval database by observing the outputs of the RAG system, an attack known as a Membership Inference Attack (MIA). Despite the significance of this threat, MIAs against RAG systems have yet remained under-explored. This study addresses this gap by introducing an efficient and easy-to-use method for conducting MIA against RAG systems. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our attack using two benchmark datasets and multiple generative models, showing that the membership of a document in the retrieval database can be efficiently determined through the creation of an appropriate prompt in both black-box and gray-box settings. Our findings highlight the importance of implementing security countermeasures in deployed RAG systems to protect the privacy and security of retrieval databases.
C.A. Micchelli, W.L. Miranker
Journal of the ACM
Saurabh Paul, Christos Boutsidis, et al.
JMLR
Joxan Jaffar
Journal of the ACM
Kenneth L. Clarkson, Elad Hazan, et al.
Journal of the ACM