Incentive Mechanism Design for Unbiased Federated Learning with Randomized Client Participation

Abstract

Incentive mechanism is crucial for federated learning (FL) when rational clients do not have the same interests in the global model as the server. However, due to system heterogeneity and limited budget, it is generally impractical for the server to incentivize all clients to participate in all training rounds (known as full participation). The existing FL incentive mechanisms are typically designed by stimulating a fixed subset of clients based on their data quantity or system resources. Hence, FL is performed only using this subset of clients throughout the entire training process, leading to a biased model because of data heterogeneity. This paper proposes a game-theoretic incentive mechanism for FL with randomized client participation, where the server adopts a customized pricing strategy that motivates different clients to join with different participation levels (probabilities) for obtaining an unbiased and high-performance model. Each client responds to the server's monetary incentive by choosing its best participation level, to maximize its profit based on not only the incurred local cost but also its intrinsic value for the global model. To effectively evaluate clients' contribution to the model performance, we derive a new convergence bound which analytically predicts how clients' arbitrary participation levels and their heterogeneous data affect the model performance. By solving a non-convex optimization problem, our analysis reveals that the intrinsic value leads to the interesting possibility of bi-directional payment between the server and clients. Experimental results using real datasets on a hardware prototype demonstrate the superiority of our mechanism in achieving higher model performance for the server as well as higher profits for the clients.